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I. INTRODUCTION 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) litigation 
permeates the American justice system.  On average, litigants file one 
new ERISA case somewhere in a district court every week.1  These 
current cases are becoming increasingly “lawyer generated,” meaning 
that they are brought by plaintiffs’ attorneys targeting ERISA plans and 
not by ERISA plan participants themselves.2 
A recent trend in ERISA litigation, proprietary fund cases, targets 
plan sponsors who are also financial institutions.3  Plaintiffs allege that 
their employers breached their fiduciary duties to the plan when the plan 
included the employers’ own investment funds.4  The employer pockets 
fees charged to the plan.5  The plaintiffs argue this transaction is a 
conflict of interest and, therefore, a breach of fiduciary duty under 
ERISA.6  While many employers elect to settle these proprietary fund 
cases to avoid excessive litigation costs, the burden of proof for fiduciary 
breach under ERISA may drastically affect their outcomes. 
ERISA § 409(a) states that fiduciaries who breach duties to a plan 
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“shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the 
plan resulting from each such breach.”7  The circuits are split as to 
whether a burden-shifting framework should apply to ERISA cases 
involving breach of fiduciary duty.  Although the circuit split has existed 
since the early 1990s, two recent cases in the Fourth and Tenth Circuits 
outline the arguments for and against the burden-shifting framework.8  
Fiduciaries and plan participants await a definitive ruling from the 
Supreme Court.  Yet, the Supreme Court recently refused to hear a case 
which presented an opportunity to resolve the split.9 
Despite the fear ERISA strikes into the hearts of seasoned lawyers 
and judges alike, this circuit split is framed around ordinary statutory 
construction principles, rather than substantive legal principles.  Both the 
Tenth and Fourth Circuits present plausible arguments for their 
interpretations of ERISA § 409(a).  The heart of the split is whether 
Congress intended to preserve the application of the common law of 
trusts’ burden-shifting framework to employee benefit plan fiduciaries 
when it enacted ERISA. 
With thousands of cases and countless complicated fact patterns, this 
circuit split matters because application of a burden-shifting framework 
creates a participant-friendly environment.  Ordinarily, the party filing 
the lawsuit will have the burden of proving the entirety of the case.  If the 
burden of causation shifts to the plan fiduciary, however, plaintiff 
participants can survive the pleading stage of litigation more frequently.  
More cases against plans increases plan sponsorship and administration 
costs.  Thus, the burden-shifting framework eliminates a statutory 
safeguard for plan fiduciaries because absent burden-shifting, cases in 
which the plaintiff is unable to prove the element of causation will not 
survive long in the court process, thereby decreasing costs and 
preventing fiduciary liability.  Furthermore, claimants may face radically 
different prognoses for success depending upon the circuit, creating the 
inequity of uneven application of ERISA. 
If courts elect to apply a burden-shifting framework to ERISA, a 
financial institution sponsoring plans that include its own financial 
products may face an almost default burden shift.  Indeed, even without a 
uniform burden-shifting position among the circuits, many employers 
                                                            
 7.   29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2012). 
 8.   Pioneer Ctrs. Holding Co. ESOP & Tr. v. Alerus Fin., N.A., 858 F.3d 1324 (10th Cir. 
2017), cert. dismissed, 139 S. Ct. 50 (2018); Tatum v. RJR Pension Inv. Comm., 761 F.3d 346 (4th 
Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2887 (2015). 
 9.   RJR Pension Inv. Comm. v. Tatum, 135 S. Ct. 2887 (2015) (denying cert.). 
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opted to settle proprietary fund cases brought against them in 2016.10  A 
uniform burden-shifting framework would provide certainty. 
Because the cases on either side of the split are numerous, this 
Comment is limited to the arguments for and against the burden-shifting 
framework presented in Tatum v. RJR Pensions Investment 
Communications11 and Pioneer Centres Holding Co. ESOP & Trust v. 
Alerus Financial, N.A.,12 and concludes that the burden-shifting 
framework is not supported by statute, case law, or equity.  This 
Comment does not explore the complexities of the methods proposed to 
determine loss-causation used by the various circuits.  While there are 
significant legal implications surrounding those loss-causation methods, 
they are beyond the scope of this Comment. 
Part II of this Comment addresses relevant background principles 
necessary to understand the significance of the circuit split, including the 
history and policy behind ERISA, a brief overview of the relevant 
provisions of the common law of trusts, and a comparison of the ERISA 
fiduciary and common law trustee.  Part III turns to the heart of the 
circuit split, reviewing two recent cases on either side of the burden-
shifting argument.  Part IV then explores the arguments for and against 
the burden-shifting framework.  The relevant arguments for the burden-
shifting framework include protecting ERISA’s primary purpose, 
viewing ERISA in light of the common law of trusts, and considerations 
of equity.  The arguments against the burden-shifting framework include 
that one should implement text-based and legislative-history-informed 
interpretations, which place the burden on the plaintiff, and that the 
competing objectives of ERISA require placing the burden on the 
plaintiff.  This Part will ultimately conclude that the burden-shifting 
framework recently adopted by the Fourth Circuit in Tatum is not an 
appropriate interpretation of ERISA § 409(a).  Part V looks ahead to the 
Supreme Court’s role in resolving the circuit split and argues the Court 
should step in to affirm the lack of a burden-shifting framework. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The complexities of ERISA require an understanding of its history 
and its departure from the common law of trusts.  Additionally, statutory 
construction issues often turn on the context of a statute at the time it was 
                                                            
 10.   Groom Law Grp., supra note 3. 
 11.   See infra Section III.A. 
 12.   See infra Section III.B. 
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passed, as well as the complexities within the statute.  Relevant 
background on ERISA, fiduciary responsibilities, and the common law 
of trusts sets the stage for the circuit split discussed in Parts III and IV. 
A. The Common Law of Trusts 
The common law of trusts is relevant to this circuit split because the 
Fourth Circuit (and others) uses the common law of trusts as the 
backdrop for implementing a burden-shifting framework.  The 
Restatement (Third) of Trusts provides an outline of the common law of 
trusts.  A trust is a legal organization or entity that holds assets for the 
benefit of another, the beneficiary.13  The trustee of a trust is the person 
who holds or controls the assets that have been set aside in the trust.14  
The trustee has a responsibility to act in the best interest of the 
beneficiary of the trust while managing the assets.15  The Restatement 
recognizes that, without a breach, a trustee is not liable for a loss but is 
accountable for a profit arising out of the trust.16  For example, a trustee 
is not liable for loss resulting from theft, if the trustee acted with 
reasonable care to protect the property from loss.17  A trustee whose 
breach is the cause of a loss to the trust is required to “restore the values 
of the trust” to what they would have been had the breach not occurred.18  
This means a trustee is held personally liable to the trust beneficiaries for 
breaches resulting from the trustee’s failure to act prudently or to satisfy 
other duties.19 
The Restatement also speaks to the burden of proof for the causation 
element of a breach of trust claim, placing it squarely on the defendant 
after a prima facie showing of breach and loss.20  The Restatement 
comments indicate that equity requires placing that burden on the 
fiduciary.21 
The duties of a common law trustee include: (1) administering the 
                                                            
 13.   WARD L. THOMAS AND LEONARD J. HENZKE, JR., TRUSTS: COMMON LAW AND IRC 
501(C)(3) AND 4947, 4 (2003), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopica03.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
4WPX-6BZ6]. 
 14.   Id. at 5. 
 15.   Id.  
 16.   RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 99 (AM. LAW INST. 2012). 
 17.   Id. § 99 cmt. b. 
 18.   Id. § 100. 
 19.   Id. § 100 cmt. a.  
 20.   Id. § 100 cmt. f. 
 21.   Id.  
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trust in accordance with its terms and applicable law;22 (2) exercising 
prudence,23 loyalty,24 and impartiality;25 (3) informing beneficiaries;26 
and (4) fulfilling certain obligations to co-trustees.27  The trustee owes 
his or her duties to the current beneficiaries of the trust,28 and if there are 
multiple beneficiaries in succession, any of which having an income 
interest, the trustee has a duty to invest and administer the trust to 
produce an income that will balance the interests of present and future 
beneficiaries.29  Trustees may not delegate their duties except for rare 
circumstances.30 
A breach of trust occurs when a trustee fails to comply with any of 
the duties owed to a beneficiary.31  If a trustee breaches duties owed to a 
beneficiary, liability follows for the amount necessary to restore the trust 
to the position it would have been in had no breach occurred.32  In 
addition, the trustee must repay any amount he or she personally 
benefited from because of the breach.33  Nevertheless, the common law 
of trusts permits a trust to relieve a trustee from liability for a breach, 
provided the trust does not relieve the trustee from liability for bad faith 
or for failure to account for profits arising from a breach.34 
B. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
ERISA’s statutory scheme deviates from the common law of trusts.  
Congress passed ERISA in 1974 to remedy “certain defects in the private 
retirement system” that limited the income security of private retirement 
plan holders.35  Specifically, Congress passed ERISA after determining 
the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 1958 (“WPPDA”) did 
not require adequate fiduciary accountability.36  Through the WPPDA, 
Congress attempted to protect pension recipients and required disclosure 
                                                            
 22.   Id. § 76. 
 23.   Id. § 77. 
 24.   Id. § 78. 
 25.   Id. § 79. 
 26.   Id. § 82. 
 27.   Id. § 81. 
 28.   See id. § 79(1). 
 29.   Id. § 79(2). 
 30.   See id. § 80(1). 
 31.   Id. § 93. 
 32.   Id. § 100(a). 
 33.   Id. § 100(b). 
 34.   Id. § 96. 
 35.   29 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1461 (2012); H.R. Rep. No. 93-533, at 4639 (1973). 
 36.   H.R. Rep. No. 93-533, at 4641. 
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of more information by plan fiduciaries.37  However, the WPPDA only 
required that plan fiduciaries disclose certain, limited pension plan 
details to the Secretary of Labor.38  Congress intended ERISA to remedy 
the fundamental flaws in the WPPDA—“weak” disclosure requirements 
and limited fiduciary responsibilities.39 
Through ERISA, Congress intended to protect consumer 
expectations by “promoting informed financial decision making,” 
preventing employer abuse in pension programs, and protecting the 
interests of employees who relied on employer provided plans.40  
Nevertheless, ERISA also protects an employer’s interest in creation, 
control, and design of plans, creating some tension between ERISA’s 
other consumer-protection-oriented policies.41  ERISA does not require a 
private employer to provide a plan to employees.42  The costs of 
administering a plan must be reasonable.43  If the costs are too high, an 
employer may simply refuse to offer a plan to employees.44  These dual, 
competing purposes of ERISA naturally create tension between the 
protection of plan participants and the policies designed to encourage 
voluntary employer participation. 
Rather than requiring employer participation, ERISA creates 
“minimum standards” for retirement savings plans provided voluntarily 
by employers.45  These minimum standards allow Congress to protect 
plan participants, leaving them better off under ERISA, while giving 
employers options.46  Employers can choose to sponsor a plan meeting 
only the minimum requirements, or they can choose to exceed the 
minimum requirements in one area but not in others.47  Ultimately, the 
flexibility of ERISA requirements for employers is notable because 
employers can tailor plans to meet the needs of the company and 
employees, so long as employers meet minimum standards.48 
                                                            
 37.   Id. at 4642.  
 38.   Id. at 4645–46.  
 39.   Id. at 4642.  
 40.   PETER J. WIEDENBECK, ERISA: PRINCIPLES OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 14 (2010). 
 41.   Id.  
 42.   DAVID A. PRATT AND SHARON REECE, ERISA AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW: THE 
ESSENTIALS 6–7 (2010). 
 43.   Employers are incentivized to offer benefit plans to attract and retain talented employees.  
Added expenses related to providing these benefits may not prevent a large employer from offering 
certain benefits, but small and mid-size businesses may feel the crunch of added costs.  
 44.   WIEDENBECK, supra note 40, at 18. 
 45.   Id.  
 46.   See id. at 14, 18–19. 
 47.   See id. at 19.  
 48.   Id.  
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The ERISA fiduciary is distinct from the common law fiduciary.  A 
fiduciary is a person who takes on special responsibilities on behalf of 
others.49  All fiduciaries owe general duties of prudence and loyalty to 
persons to whom they are responsible.50  The common law of trusts 
contains general fiduciary duties; however, trust-law may not provide a 
“‘one size fits all’ approach.”51  ERISA § 404 outlines duties for ERISA 
fiduciaries.52  Despite similarities to trustee duties under common law, 
Congress intended ERISA fiduciary duties to depart from the common 
law fiduciary duties to serve the particular needs of employer-sponsored 
plans.53 
An ERISA fiduciary must “discharge his duties” to the plan “solely 
in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries.”54  Two “exclusive” 
purposes are stated: (1) providing benefits and (2) defraying 
administration costs.55  Fiduciaries must use the skill, care, and diligence 
that a prudent person, familiar with the facts and plan matters, would use 
in like circumstances.56 
One goal of ERISA is to make plan decision makers accountable.57  
Accountability requires legal liability.58  Under ERISA, benefit plan 
decision makers are accountable as fiduciaries, not just as traditional 
trustees.59  Thus, ERISA bans certain transactions entirely due to their 
insider nature.60  Further, ERISA does not allow plan documents to 
exculpate fiduciaries from liability, a departure from the common law of 
trusts.61  ERISA fiduciaries may follow “plan documents only insofar as 
they are consistent with ERISA.” 62  If a plan document authorizes a 
departure from ERISA proscribed fiduciary duties, the plan provision is 
void.63  Thus, while common law trustees may depart from the default 
                                                            
 49.   See LAW JOURNAL PRESS, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW: ERISA AND BEYOND § 12.03 
(2018). 
 50.   RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 76–79 (AM. LAW INST. 2012). 
 51.   Howard v. Shay, No. CV 91-146 DT, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20153, *19 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 
15, 1993), rev’d on other grounds, 100 F.3d 1484 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 52.   29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2012).  
 53.   WIEDENBECK, supra note 40, at 110. 
 54.   29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1). 
 55.   Id. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(i)–(ii). 
 56.   Id. § 1104(a)(1)(B). 
 57.   LAW JOURNAL PRESS, supra note 49, § 12.07. 
 58.   Id.  
 59.   WIEDENBECK, supra note 40, at 110. 
 60.   Id. 
 61.   Id. at 110, 124. 
 62.   Id. at 124. 
 63.   Id. 
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rules in trust documents, ERISA fiduciaries must meet the minimum 
standards of ERISA. 
III. CIRCUIT CONFLICT HISTORY 
ERISA § 409(a) states: 
Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any 
of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries 
by this title shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any 
losses to the plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore to 
such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through 
use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary . . .64 
The federal circuits split sharply as to who bears the burden of 
proving that a fiduciary breach caused a loss.  Courts adopting the 
burden-shifting framework, placing the burden on the defendant, hold 
that Congress did not intend ERISA to supersede common law 
principles.  Under this reasoning, courts should interpret ERISA using 
the common law of trusts as a guide. 
The following cases exemplify the heart of the circuit split regarding 
who bears the burden of causation.  The majority in the 2014 Fourth 
Circuit case Tatum v. RJR Pension Investment Communications65 argues 
strongly for the burden-shifting framework, using principles of statutory 
construction and policy arguments.  In contrast, the 2017 majority in the 
Tenth Circuit case Pioneer Centres Holding Co. ESOP & Trust v. Alerus 
Financial, N.A.66 follows the arguments in the Tatum dissent, holding 
that statutory construction and policy call for no burden-shifting under 
ERISA. 
A. The Fourth Circuit 
In Tatum, the court implemented a burden-shifting framework in 
favor of plan participants.67  Tatum arose out of a “spin-off” transaction 
involving the merged Nabisco and R.J. Reynolds (“RJR”) Tobacco 
companies to prevent tobacco litigation from affecting Nabisco’s stock 
price.68  On the spin-off date, RJR created a new 401(k) plan (the 
                                                            
 64.   29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2012). 
 65.   761 F.3d 346 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2887 (2015). 
 66.   858 F.3d 1324 (10th Cir. 2017), cert. dismissed, 139 S. Ct. 50 (2018). 
 67.   Tatum, 761 F.3d at 362–63.  
 68.   Id. at 350–51. 
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“Plan”).69  The Plan included a “frozen” Nabisco fund (the “Fund”), 
allowing plan participants to retain their investment in the company fund 
from the prior, pre-spin-off plan, but preventing additional investment in 
the Fund.70  Although the Plan required the Fund to remain in the Plan, 
Plan fiduciaries voted to remove the Fund only six months after the 
completion of the spin-off, spending only minutes discussing the 
potential options for the Fund.71  Unfortunately, the continuous tobacco 
litigation negatively impacted the Fund in the months leading up to its 
scheduled disposition.72 
Company executives considered what to do in light of the declining 
value of the Fund.  Ultimately, they decided to continue with the removal 
of the Fund primarily to avoid both potential liability for changing course 
after some participants sold their assets in the Fund and any additional 
monitoring costs keeping the Fund would require.73  The company also 
falsely informed participants that the law did not allow the Plan to keep 
company stock.74 
Prior to the disposition of the Fund, plaintiff Richard Tatum 
contacted company executives and asked them to wait to dispose of the 
funds.75  He informed the executives that the disposal would cause him to 
lose 60% of the value of his assets in the Plan.76  He cited examples 
where other acquired companies retained frozen funds from prior owners 
in their plans.77  The company informed Tatum that nothing could be 
done to stop the disposal of the Fund.78  The disposal took place, causing 
a significant loss to the participants in the Plan, including Mr. Tatum’s 
account.79 
Nabisco’s stock value started to rise only months after the disposal of 
the Fund.80  A subsequent bidding war over Nabisco drove up the stock 
price.81  Nabisco was flushed with cash and later purchased by RJR.82  
                                                            
 69.   Id. at 351. 
 70.   Id. at 351–52. 
 71.   Id. at 352. 
 72.   Id. at 353. 
 73.   Id. 
 74.   Id. 
 75.   Id. at 354. 
 76.   Id. 
 77.   Id. 
 78.   Id. 
 79.   Id. 
 80.   Id. 
 81.   Id. 
 82.   Id.  
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Stock prices had increased significantly, but it was too late for the Plan 
participants to realize the gains.83  Tatum filed a class action suit against 
the company under ERISA, alleging the executives were plan fiduciaries 
and failed to act prudently with respect to the Plan.84 
1. The Majority’s Analysis: The Burden of Proof 
The Fourth Circuit ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that a 
burden-shifting framework is consistent with the purpose of ERISA.  The 
district court had held that it was “most fair” to require the defendant 
fiduciary to bear the burden of proving causation.85  After the plaintiff 
made a prima facie case of breach and loss to the plan, the burden to 
prove causation, or rather the lack thereof, shifted to the defendant.86  
The circuit court looked to principles of statutory construction to 
determine if this was the proper burden of proof allocation.87  
Acknowledging that the general rule when a statute is silent as to the 
burden of proof is to assign it to the plaintiff, the court found that an 
exception to this rule may arise in the common law of trusts.88  The court 
noted that it had previously adopted a burden-shifting framework in a 
1982 case, holding that “one who acts in violation of his fiduciary duty 
bears the burden of showing that he acted fairly and reasonably.”89  The 
court further noted that, while a breach by itself does not automatically 
entail causation, imprudent fiduciary conduct will usually result in a 
loss.90 
The court reasoned that the burden-shifting framework “comports 
with the structure and purpose of ERISA” because ERISA’s primary 
objective is protecting plan participants.91  Quoting the Secretary of 
Labor’s amicus brief, the court said that forcing the plaintiff to bear the 
burden of causation after a prima facie case of breach of fiduciary duty 
creates an “‘unfair advantage to a defendant who has already been shown 
to have engaged in wrongful conduct.’”92 
                                                            
 83.   Id. at 354–55. 
 84.   Id. at 355. 
 85.   Id. at 362. 
 86.   Id. 
 87.   Id. 
 88.   Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 100 cmt. f (AM. LAW. INST. 2012); 
BOGERT & BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 871 (2d rev. ed. 1995 & Supp. 2013)). 
 89.   Id. at 362–63 (quoting Brink v. DaLesio, 667 F.2d 420, 426 (4th Cir. 1981)). 
 90.   Id. at 361.  
 91.   Id. at 363 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2012)).  
 92.   Id. (quoting Brief of Seth D. Harris, the Acting Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in 
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2. The Dissent’s Analysis 
Judge Wilkinson dissented and would have held that ERISA § 409(a) 
requires a plaintiff to prove loss causation because not every loss to a 
plan qualifies for § 409(a) relief.93  Judge Wilkinson also disagreed with 
the method of determining loss causation.94  Rather than looking at 
failure to investigate or evaluate a potential investment, liability under 
ERISA § 409(a) is only appropriate when an “imprudent” investment is 
made.95 
Judge Wilkinson pointed to three consequences of plaintiffs bearing 
the burden of causation: (1) loss causation is part of plaintiff’s burden to 
establish fiduciary liability under ERISA, (2) establishing liability is 
difficult when a fiduciary acts prudently, and (3) there are other remedial 
options when plaintiffs cannot demonstrate loss causation.96  Judge 
Wilkinson indicated that a burden-shifting framework is not appropriate 
because Congress did not provide for it under the statute.97  When a 
statute is silent as to who bears the burden of proof, the default rule of 
statutory construction is to require plaintiffs to bear the burden of proof 
for their claims.98  Most circuit precedent supports placing the burden on 
the plaintiff.99  The cases advocating for a burden-shifting framework 
involved breaches of fiduciary responsibilities that were more serious.100  
The dissent also asserted that the burden of loss causation would be 
difficult in cases where the fiduciary is “objectively prudent.”101  Judge 
Wilkinson indicated Congress did not intend to punish honest fiduciaries 
when there are plan losses in all cases.102  Additionally, Judge Wilkinson 
stated ERISA sets out other remedies for plan participants if a loss 
causation cannot be demonstrated, including removal of a fiduciary, 
                                                            
Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants and Urging Reversal at 20, Tatum v. RJR Pension Inv. Comm., 761 
F.3d 346 (4th Cir. 2014) (No. 13-1360)). 
 93.   Id. at 373 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). 
 94.   Id. at 374. 
 95.   Id. 
 96.   Id. at 374–76. 
 97.   Id. at 375. 
 98.   Id. (citing Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 56 (2005)). 
 99.   Id. (citing Silverman v. Mut. Benefit Life Ins. Co., 138 F.3d 98, 105 (2d. Cir. 1998); Kuper 
v. Iovenko, 66 F.3d 1447, 1459 (6th Cir. 1995), abrogated by on other grounds, Fifth Third Bancorp 
v. Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. 2459, 2467 (2014); Willett v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., 953 
F.2d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 1992)). 
 100.   Id. (citing McDonald v. Provident Indem. Life Ins. Co., 60 F.3d 234, 237 (5th Cir. 1995); 
N.Y. State Teamsters Council Health & Hosp. Fund v. Estate of DePerno, 18 F.3d 179, 182 (2d Cir. 
1994); Martin v. Feilen, 965 F.2d 660, 671–72 (8th Cir. 1982)).  
 101.   Id. at 376. 
 102.   Id. 
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saying “ERISA is a ‘comprehensive and reticulated statute’ and 
Congress crafted its provisions with care.”103 
Judge Wilkinson argued the majority wrongfully justified its burden-
shifting framework as a deterrent for imprudent fiduciaries.104  ERISA 
already imposes sufficient deterrents for imprudent fiduciaries, including 
removal and personal liability if breaches result in losses to the plan’s 
assets.105 
B. The Tenth Circuit 
A panel of the Tenth Circuit, like Judge Wilkinson, rejected the 
burden-shifting framework in Pioneer Centres Holding Co. ESOP & 
Trust v. Alerus Financial, N.A. and affirmed the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment to an Employee Stock Ownership Plan (“ESOP”) 
fiduciary.  The court also determined that evidence of causation was 
speculative.106 
Pioneer Centres Holding Company (“Pioneer”) operated several car 
dealerships in Colorado and California.107  Pioneer had an ESOP with 
certain company executives serving as trustees.108  Pioneer’s founder, 
Jack Brewer, initially owned all of Pioneer’s stock; however, a series of 
transactions over several years resulted in Brewer selling approximately 
one third of his stock to the Pioneer ESOP.109  Pioneer’s ESOP trustees 
wanted the ESOP to own all of Pioneer’s stock.110  The ESOP proposed 
to buy out Brewer and the other company executives.111  An independent 
trustee, Alerus, was hired due to the conflict of interest between the 
ESOP trustees and stockholders.112 
As part of its contract with Pioneer, Land Rover, one of Pioneer’s 
partner dealers, had the right to approve any change in ownership, as 
well as a right of first refusal, for any Pioneer stock offered for sale.113  
                                                            
 103.   Id. (quoting Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 251 (1993)). 
 104.   Id. at 379. 
 105.   Id. 
 106.   Pioneer Ctrs. Holding Co. ESOP & Tr. v. Alerus Fin., N.A., 858 F.3d 1324, 1326–27 (10th 
Cir. 2017), cert. dismissed, 139 S. Ct. 50 (2018). 
 107.   Id. at 1327. 
 108.   Id. 
 109.   Id. 
 110.   Id. 
 111.   Id. 
 112.   Id. 
 113.   Id.  
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The proposed stock transaction was sent to Land Rover for approval.114  
Land Rover indicated that it never approved Brewer’s initial sale of one 
third of his stock to Pioneer; their records still showed Brewer as the sole 
owner of Pioneer’s stock.115  Pioneer claimed it did not need Land 
Rover’s approval because only the ownership of the holding company 
changed, not the ownership of any dealerships.116  Land Rover 
disagreed.117  Land Rover demanded that Pioneer reverse the prior stock 
transactions.118  Land Rover indicated it would not approve the 100% 
ESOP ownership.119 
Pioneer pushed back, challenging Land Rover’s reasoning and 
restating its understanding that Land Rover would not approve ESOP-
owned dealerships.120  Land Rover responded that it did not disapprove 
of all ESOP ownership generally, but stood firm: Land Rover did not 
approve this transaction because Pioneer did not ask Land Rover for 
prior authorization and violated its agreement with Land Rover.121  
However, Land Rover alleged that Pioneer was “free to submit any 
ownership transfer proposal . . . and [Land Rover] will consider it in 
good faith and on the merits.”122  Pioneer did not respond.123  Nearly a 
year later, Land Rover approved Brewer’s sale of one third of his stock 
to Pioneer, but still maintained it would not approve 100% ESOP 
ownership.124 
Despite the dispute with Land Rover, the third-party trustee, Alerus, 
drafted a proposed stock transfer agreement to transfer ownership of all 
of Pioneer’s stock to the ESOP.125  Brewer revised the agreement 
substantially, but Alerus found the changes unacceptable and would not 
sign off on the transaction.126  Ultimately, the parties abandoned the 
transaction.127 
After a year, Pioneer sold its assets to Kuni Enterprises (“Kuni”) at a 
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price significantly higher than the price proposed in the abandoned 
transfer agreement with Alerus.128  After completion of the Kuni 
transaction, the ESOP sued Alerus for breach of fiduciary duty under 
ERISA § 409 because Alerus had abandoned the transaction.129 
Alerus argued it did not breach its fiduciary duties to the ESOP and, 
even if it did, its actions did not cause plan losses because Land Rover 
would not have approved the transaction.130  The district court granted 
summary judgment for Alerus, holding that the ESOP did not meet its 
burden to prove Alerus’s breach caused the loss to the ESOP.131 
A Tenth Circuit panel addressed the loss causation issue, holding that 
the plaintiff bore the burden of causation and specifically rejecting the 
burden-shifting framework.132  Citing a 2002 Tenth Circuit case and a 
2011 Fourth Circuit case, the court recognized that the plaintiff must 
prove causation before a fiduciary is liable.133  Furthermore, because 
ERISA § 409 itself is silent as to who bears the burden of causation, the 
default rule places the burden of proving all elements of a breach of 
fiduciary duty claim on the plaintiff.134 
The panel rejected as inapplicable certain exceptions to the default 
rule.  These exceptions include cases where an element of a claim may 
be characterized as an affirmative defense and, specifically for fiduciary 
issues, the common law of trusts.135  The panel gave reasons for rejecting 
both of these exceptions in this case: (1) legislative history does not 
support a burden-shifting framework under ERISA § 409, and (2) the law 
of trusts does not apply to ERISA.136  Both reasons are discussed below. 
First, the panel reviewed ERISA’s legislative history and found no 
evidence Congress intended to implement a burden-shifting 
framework.137  Causation may not be fairly characterized as an 
affirmative defense to fiduciary liability because causation may not be 
removed from ERISA § 409(a) without substantially changing the 
meaning and intention of the statute.138  The court held that causation is 
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an element of the claim and the plaintiff, therefore, has the burden of 
proof.139 
Second, the panel rejected the rationale relied upon by the Fourth, 
Fifth, and Eighth Circuits when those courts adopted a burden-shifting 
framework.140  The panel stated that “‘the law of trusts often will inform, 
but will not necessarily determine the outcome of, an effort to interpret 
ERISA’s fiduciary duties.’”141  The panel emphasized the importance of 
the plain language of the statute: “[w]here the plain language of the 
statute limits the fiduciary’s liability to losses resulting from a breach of 
fiduciary duty, there seems little reason to read the statute as requiring 
the plaintiff to show only that the loss is related to the breach.”142 
Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit found no reason to implement an 
exception to the default rule of statutory construction because the plain 
language of ERISA § 409(a) did not require it.143  Furthermore, a 
concurring opinion by Justice Jacobs, citing a Second Circuit case, noted 
that the burden-shifting framework would remove a “check” on 
“sweeping [fiduciary] liability,” thus eliminating employer willingness to 
participate in ERISA plans.144 
IV. DISCUSSION 
ERISA is a complicated statute with a long history.  The cases on 
either side of the split are numerous and date as far back as the late 
1980s.  This Part weighs the arguments for and against the burden-
shifting framework in light of the purposes of ERISA, case law, equity, 
and principles of statutory construction.  First, Section A will address the 
uniqueness of the ERISA fiduciary.  Second, Section B will explore the 
statute’s language, concluding that neither the plain language nor 
legislative history support a burden-shifting framework.  Finally, Section 
C will consider the primary purposes of ERISA and the role of equity.  
This Part concludes that the burden-shifting framework is not 
appropriate. 
Courts faced with the difficult task of interpreting ERISA 
acknowledge that the plaintiff would bear the burden of causation under 
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default rules.  Yet, some courts, like the Fourth Circuit in Tatum, look 
beyond the plain language of ERISA § 409 to extrinsic evidence of 
Congress’s supposed intent.  They look to several provisions in the 
legislative history of ERISA and case law to support their interpretation 
of ERISA § 409.  The three main arguments supporting the burden-
shifting framework, discussed below, are: (1) ERISA’s primary purpose 
calls for protecting plan participants, (2) ERISA fiduciary duties are 
based in the common law of trusts and Congress left the courts to 
develop the common law, and (3) equity requires shifting the burden 
when a participant has demonstrated a breach and a loss. 
A majority of circuits, like the Tenth Circuit in Pioneer Centres, do 
not support a burden-shifting framework for ERISA § 409.  Their 
justifications are numerous, but the three major arguments are (1) ERISA 
and the common law of trusts each provide for different fiduciary duties 
and remedies for breach, (2) statutory interpretation calls for placing the 
burden on the plaintiff, and (3) ERISA’s competing purposes must be 
carefully balanced to achieve its ultimate purpose of encouraging private 
employers to provide retirement plans for employees.  Each argument 
will be addressed below. 
A. ERISA fiduciaries have separate duties from common law trustees. 
ERISA is not a mere codification of the common law of trusts.  
Congress did not intend for the common law of trusts to apply to ERISA 
fiduciaries.  Congress carefully created the ERISA fiduciary to account 
for the balance between plan participants and the plan administrator.  For 
example, ERISA’s fiduciary obligations make it possible for a plan 
fiduciary to be both a plan participant and company employee.145  Unlike 
the common law of trusts, ERISA actually allows these fiduciary 
relationships to exist.146  ERISA creates an ‘“artificial definition of [a] 
‘fiduciary,’” which allows an employer to act as a fiduciary only when it 
is acting with discretion toward the plan.147 
There are three major differences between common law trustees and 
ERISA fiduciaries.  First, ERISA fiduciaries owe their duty to the plan as 
a whole; they do not have a duty to act with impartiality toward multiple 
plan participants.148  Second, ERISA fiduciary duties are mandatory; that 
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is, they are not subject to modification by individual plan documents.149  
Third, ERISA’s duty of loyalty, also called the exclusive benefit rule, 
looks to the actual motivation of the fiduciary, creating a subjective 
test.150 
Congress envisioned a more tailored set of requirements for 
fiduciaries of ERISA plans, including a “prudent man” standard for 
conduct.151  The new fiduciary requirements in ERISA were a 
codification of “certain principles developed in the evolution of the law 
of trusts.”152  Yet, there are several key departures from trust law.  First, 
ERISA fiduciaries do not have an explicit duty of impartiality when 
dealing with multiple plan participants.153  ERISA fiduciaries discharge 
their duties with respect to the plan itself, and the Supreme Court has 
held that individual plan participants may not recover for individual 
damages; instead, only the plan as a whole may recover plan losses.154  
Second, ERISA permits an employee of the plan sponsor employer to 
serve as a plan fiduciary even though that service may create a conflict of 
interest.155 
Congress intended for courts to interpret ERISA’s new fiduciary 
standards “bearing in mind the special nature and purposes of employee 
benefit plans intended to be effectuated by [ERISA].”156  While Congress 
codified ERISA fiduciary standards, it adapted the common law to be 
“appropriate for employee benefit plans.”157  Congress considered the 
“voluntary nature of private retirement plans” when ERISA was 
passed.158  ERISA’s voluntary nature is significant because if ERISA 
requirements are too burdensome, an employer could opt out entirely.  
Congress considered this fact, striking a delicate balance between the 
needs of employees and employers. 
In addition to new standards for ERISA fiduciaries, Congress added 
new remedies for plan participants under ERISA, increasing the risk for 
plan fiduciaries.159  ERISA increases access to federal court and 
implements more judicial remedies, including “pecuniary, equitable (e.g., 
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injunctive), and declaratory judgment relief,” which were not available 
under WPPDA.160  Some argue that ERISA did not introduce new 
fiduciary liability because the common law of trusts pre-dates ERISA 
and ERISA merely codified certain sections.  But ERISA makes it easier 
for a plaintiff to bring a claim in federal court.161  Rather than relying on 
non-uniform state law to protect plan participants, ERISA creates 
uniform federal standards. 
Proponents of the burden-shifting framework assert Congress based 
ERISA on the common law of trusts and therefore the law of trusts 
should inform the analysis of whether the burden-shifting framework 
should apply to ERISA.  However, this is merely a starting point for the 
analysis.  As discussed above, the common law of trusts contains similar 
remedies for trust beneficiaries in the event of breach of trust as ERISA 
provides plan participants in the event of fiduciary breach.162  These 
proponents argue comments in the Restatement of Trusts support the 
burden-shifting framework even though it is not found in ERISA.163  
While the default rule of statutory construction calls for placing the 
burden on the plaintiff, the influence of the law of trusts, so the argument 
goes, allows an exception to this rule.164  The Supreme Court has 
indicated that ERISA “borrowed” from the common law of trusts.165  
Nevertheless, the Court should not look to the common law of trusts 
before looking to the language of ERISA itself to determine the intent of 
Congress.166  Additionally, the average ERISA plan “covers hundreds or 
even thousands of individual participants.”167  This is a stark contrast to 
the average testamentary trust, which covers a limited number of 
individuals.168  Thus, while the common law of trusts may have informed 
Congress, it is not the “entire story.”169  Given its purpose, and numerous 
departures from the common law of trusts, ERISA is a complicated, 
carefully constructed statute; therefore, the starting place for analysis is 
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the statute.170 
B. Statutory interpretation calls for placing the burden on the plaintiff. 
The circuit split revolves around a disagreement about statutory 
interpretation.  Courts often interpret the meaning of statutes with 
language that is subject to several logical interpretations.  Courts use 
several methods to derive the meaning of a statutory provision, including 
textualism and intentionalism.171 
1. Text-based interpretive methods do not support a burden-shifting 
framework. 
A court should begin its analysis of the meaning of a statute with the 
plain meaning of the language of the statute.172  Next, it should examine 
the entire statute, as well as dictionaries or similar statutes in other 
jurisdictions, to clarify ambiguity in the language.  The focus should be 
on what the text actually says, rather than on what certain members of 
Congress may have intended the text to mean.173 
Courts also often use canons of construction, or “rules of thumb,” 
that help determine the meaning of a statute.174  There is no real 
definitive list of so-called canons, but most lists include canons for (1) 
determining the ordinary and specialized meaning of a word or phrase in 
a statute; (2) identifying important words such as “and,” “or,” “shall,” 
and “may;” and (3) determining the role of silence in a statute or 
exclusion of a term from a list.175 
Default rules of statutory construction call for the entire burden of 
proof for every element of a claim to fall on the plaintiff.  When 
Congress shifts the burden of proof for a claim, we can presume it does 
so expressly.  If a cause of action arises under a statute, the first place 
courts look to is the statute itself.176  The ordinary rule calls for placing 
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the burden on the plaintiff when the statute is silent as to the burden.177  
There are, however, some exceptions to this rule.178  If an element of the 
cause of action could be characterized as an affirmative defense or an 
exemption, then the burden may be shifted to the defendant.179 
To determine whether causation could be characterized as an 
affirmative defense or an exemption in ERISA § 409(a), we begin with 
the language in the statute: 
Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any 
of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries 
by this title shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any 
losses to the plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore to 
such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through 
use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary . . .180 
Here, the above language is silent as to who bears the burden of 
proof on this cause of action.  To demonstrate the effect of the absence of 
a causation element, we can remove the causation element from the 
statue.  If we remove the causal language “resulting from such breach” 
and re-read the statute 
Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any 
of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries 
by this title shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any 
losses to the plan [omit “resulting from such breach”], and to restore to 
such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through 
use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary . . . 
the result is a provision that holds fiduciaries strictly liable for all losses 
to a plan in the event of a breach, no matter the cause.  The provision is 
wide in scope and harsh in result: a clear deviation from the 
congressional intent expressed in ERISA § 409(a). 
Alternatively, we could tinker with the statutory language to 
characterize the causation requirement as an affirmative defense.  If 
causation were an affirmative defense, the statue may read like this: 
Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any 
of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries 
by this title shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any 
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losses to the plan [omit “resulting from such breach”], and to restore to 
such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through 
use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, unless the fiduciary can 
show the losses did not result from the breach. 
This amended version of ERISA § 409(a) explicitly places the 
burden of causation on the defendant.  The Tenth Circuit considered this 
in its analysis in Pioneer and found that causation cannot be fairly 
separated from the other parts of the statute without changing the 
meaning and result.181  The Fourth Circuit in Tatum did not conduct this 
analysis, instead choosing to focus on whether the common law of trusts 
applies to ERISA claims.182  These three statutory examples demonstrate 
that causation is an essential element of this claim and that the statutory 
language does not support a burden-shifting framework. 
Finally, when a statute’s plain language gives a reasonable meaning, 
it is not necessary to proceed further to determine that meaning.  Here, in 
ERISA § 409(a), there are no terms of art giving rise to ambiguity.  The 
statute’s silence regarding the burden of causation triggers the default 
rule that plaintiffs bear the burden of proof on all elements of their claim.  
Although it is clear the common law and concern for plan participants 
influenced Congress, courts do not need to add to the meaning of the 
words of Congress here.  The plain meaning is enough. 
2. Intent-based interpretive methods do not support a burden-shifting 
framework. 
Courts often utilize legislative history, whether they have text-based 
or intent-based interpretations, and can include a broad spectrum of 
materials.  Some items hold more weight than others.  For example, a 
committee report may be more persuasive than testimony from the floor 
of the House of Representatives because the committee likely heard more 
testimony about the issues and was more familiar with the statute.183  The 
preference for written documents, especially summaries of the position 
of the group or committee ultimately responsible for the statute, makes 
sense given the difficulty of determining the intent of Congress (a very 
large group) by piecing together the testimony of individual members.184 
Although textualists argue that the text of the statute alone reflects 
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the intention of Congress, there are cases where otherwise strictly textual 
Justices have turned to legislative history for guidance.185  It is common 
for Justices to review legislative history for relevant background on a 
statute.186  The typical scenario where an otherwise textualist Justice 
turns to legislative history for more than relevant background 
information is a case where the language of the statute is “ambiguous.”187  
Additionally, a textualist may be at an interpretive disadvantage if the 
plain text of a statute leads to a result the legislature did not intend.188 
Even if a court turns to an intent-based method when interpreting 
ERISA § 409(a), legislative history indicates Congress carefully 
considered fiduciary liability and remedies for breach when drafting 
ERISA.  Congress enacted ERISA to remedy perceived problems with 
the WPPDA’s fiduciary requirements.189  Previously, plan participants 
were primarily responsible for policing employer plans.190  Participants 
had to rely on common law, which was non-uniform among the states.191  
Congress specifically mentioned reviewing fiduciary accountability 
standards and fiduciary conduct.192  The House Report includes several 
sections addressing the committee’s goals for ERISA fiduciaries.193  
Additionally, some courts reference the remedies, other than personal 
liability of the fiduciary for losses, available to plan participants as 
evidence that Congress did not intend for every loss or fiduciary breach 
to result in personal liability.194 
Congress also did not incorporate every principle under the common 
law of trusts into ERISA.  The committee report indicates that “certain” 
common law principles are incorporated,195 but this does not mean 
Congress intended ERISA to include all of the common law of trusts.  
Evidence of the careful consideration of the common law of trusts and 
current fiduciary liability under the WPPDA strengthens the conclusion 
that Congress intended to include only the common law trust principles 
found within ERISA and to exclude all others. 
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The Supreme Court disagrees internally about the proper way to 
interpret ERISA.  One important example is the contrasting majority and 
dissenting opinions in Varity Corp. v. Howe.196  After determining that 
several of ERISA’s terms were ambiguous, Justice Breyer’s majority 
opinion looked beyond the plain text of the statute, to the common law 
meaning of the terms “fiduciary” and “administration,” and determined 
that Congress intended to refer to the common law of trusts definition of 
those terms.197  Justice Scalia joined Justice Thomas’s dissent, which 
sharply criticized the majority for looking outside of ERISA.198  Justice 
Thomas focused on the use of canons of construction to find the meaning 
of the relevant portions of ERISA: 
Congress went to great lengths to enumerate ERISA’s fiduciary 
obligations and duties, to create liability for breach of those obligations, 
and to authorize a civil suit to enforce those provisions . . . .  “The law 
is settled that however inclusive may be the general language of a 
statute, it will not be held to apply to a matter specifically dealt with in 
another part of the same enactment.”199 
Justice Thomas found Justice Breyer’s use of the common law of trusts 
as a “starting point” for interpreting ERISA to be an approach that 
“stands [the] traditional approach on its head.”200  The starting point for 
every case involving statutory construction is, according to Justice 
Thomas, the language of the statute itself.201 
As mentioned above, courts do not apply text-based or intent-based 
interpretation methods uniformly.  Neither does a single interpretation 
method yield consistent results.  There are many cases where all of the 
Justices agree that a statute’s language is plain, yet, disagree about the 
meaning of the “plain language.”202  Ultimately, reasonable Justices may 
disagree about the plainness of the language or the meaning of otherwise 
plain language in a statute. 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court recently declared that it is not 
appropriate to place artificial presumptions onto the text of ERISA if the 
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statute does not refer to any other rules.203  As discussed above, nothing 
in the plain text of ERISA § 409(a) or the legislative history of ERISA 
gives the indication that Congress intended for a burden-shifting 
framework to apply.204  When courts superimpose extrinsic statutory 
materials into their interpretation of ERISA, they are acting contrary to 
the intent of Congress. 
C. Congress enacted ERISA with competing purposes, which must be 
carefully balanced. 
When courts consider a burden-shifting framework, they consider a 
question of equity.  Specifically, on whom is it more equitable to place 
the burden of proving causation?  The Supreme Court recently 
acknowledged the “‘careful balanc[e]’” of ERISA “‘between ensuring 
fair and prompt enforcement of rights under a plan and the 
encouragement of the creation of such plans.’”205  Proponents of the 
burden-shifting framework argue that shifting the burden of causation to 
the defendant after a prima facie showing of breach and loss is more 
equitable to the plaintiff.  The plaintiff has already demonstrated the 
defendant breached its duty and should therefore have no further 
requirement to demonstrate the losses resulted from the breach because 
the defendant has acted outside the scope of his or her fiduciary duties.  
The lack of burden-shifting, those proponents argue, creates “an unfair 
advantage to a defendant who has already been shown to have engaged 
in wrongful conduct.”206  However, employer sponsored plans sued 
under ERISA § 409(a) face the reality of proving a negative.  The plan 
must bear the burden of proving lack of causation, rather than defending 
against only credible claims that survive summary judgment.  If the only 
concern of ERISA is to protect individual plaintiffs (or classes of 
plaintiffs under a single Plan), this is the correct result. 
The House Committee Report for ERISA lays out five primary 
purposes of the law: 
(1) establish equitable standards of plan administration; (2) mandate 
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minimum standards of plan design with respect to the vesting of plan 
benefits; (3) require minimum standards of fiscal responsibility by 
requiring the amortization of unfunded liabilities; (4) insure the vested 
portion of unfunded liabilities against the risk of premature plan 
termination; and (5) promote a renewed expansion of private retirement 
plans and increase the number of participants receiving private 
retirement benefits.207 
The report goes on to describe the defects in the WPPDA and its 
failure to protect plan participants.208  Proponents of the burden-shifting 
framework interpret the purposes of the law to mean that Congress was 
primarily concerned with the protection of plan participants, given the 
abuse and fraud under the prior act, and the steps taken to hold plan 
administrators accountable.  However, ERISA only covers private plans 
from private employers.  Courts must consider the balance between the 
conflicting purposes of the statute.  On the one hand, ERISA provides 
consumer protection for plan participants, ensuring fiduciaries manage 
their plan investments prudently.  Plaintiffs are often in an inferior 
position against more sophisticated parties.  Shifting the burden of 
causation to the more sophisticated defendant will protect plaintiffs who 
would otherwise have little to no access to relevant information during 
the pleadings stage.  A burden-shifting framework comports with one of 
ERISA’s objectives: to protect the interests of participants in employee 
benefit plans and their beneficiaries.209  On the other hand, ERISA 
simultaneously encourages employers to provide plans to employees, 
without requiring employers to provide the plans in the first place.  This 
makes costs to employers a viable concern for both Congress and the 
courts.  If the cost of providing and administering a plan becomes too 
high, many employers may elect not to participate.  The result: many 
employees in the private sector would be without any employer-
sponsored plan. 
Allowing burden-shifting after a prima facie showing of breach and 
loss will allow meritless cases to proceed through litigation.  There are 
many reasons a plan may suffer a loss.  In many cases, the loss is no fault 
of the fiduciary (e.g., losses due to business cycles, fiscal and monetary 
decisions by governments, natural disasters, technological disruption, 
etc.).  Indeed, even an extremely prudent plan fiduciary can be unlucky 
sometimes.  Conversely, a fiduciary who gives no thought to investment 
choices or ERISA requirements may make a prudent choice by sheer 
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blind luck.  But ERISA was not intended to remedy harmless breaches as 
evidenced by the causation requirement in ERISA § 409(a).  Proponents 
of the burden-shifting framework would remove one of ERISA 
§ 409(a)’s requirements after only two parts of the cause of action are 
met—breach and loss—and ask plan fiduciaries to prove the absence of 
causation. 
One of ERISA’s primary objectives is to promote private pension 
plans.  Congress considered the “voluntary nature” of private retirement 
plans and took steps to balance their competing objectives: (1) protect 
employee participants, and (2) promote voluntary plan sponsorship by 
employers.  Threatening fiduciaries with costly litigation, and potentially 
personal liability, whenever a plan loses money after an unrelated minor 
breach of a fiduciary duty, may discourage employers from providing 
private retirement benefits for employees. 
In the Fourth Circuit, where precedent supports a burden-shifting 
framework, the landscape for fiduciaries creates more potential for 
fiduciary liability.210  The burden-shifting framework creates a “plaintiff-
friendly” environment, out of balance from the remaining circuits.211  
The additional burdens of increased litigation, settlements, and other 
administrative costs may impact employer willingness to voluntarily 
offer plans.212  Ultimately, both ERISA plans and ERISA plan 
participants are better off without an ERISA burden-shifting framework. 
IV. RESOLVING THE SPLIT: ANOTHER OPPORTUNITY PRESENTS ITSELF 
Since Congress passed ERISA in 1976, the Supreme Court has heard 
128 cases related to the Act, but did not hear any ERISA cases in the 
2017–2018 term.213  While several Justices have been blunt about their 
opinion of ERISA cases, using words like “dreary,” “sloughy,” and 
“tedious,”214 the Court has not shied away from hearing cases over the 
last forty-two years.  Why?  The answer may be the importance 
                                                            
 210.   See Jared Burtner, Note, A Catalyst for Change: Tatum v. RJR Pension Inv. Committee, 
ERISA, and the Absence of a Uniform Loss Causation Standard, 11 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 219, 234 
(2016). 
 211.   Id.  
 212.   Id. (citing Tatum v. RJR Pension Inv. Comm., 761 F.3d 346, 383 (4th Cir. 2014) 
(Wilkinson, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2887 (2015)). 
 213.   EVERSHEDS SUTHERLAND, STEP BY STEP: EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN THE SUPREME COURT, 
3 (2017), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/step-by-step-employee-benefits-in-the-55294/ 
[https://perma.cc/MN8L-VQJR].  
 214.   Id. at 5 (these Justices include Justice Rehnquist, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice O’Connor). 
2019 WHOSE BURDEN IS IT ANYWAY? 691 
employee benefits plays in the economy.215  Private retirement plans 
account for almost 30% of personal wealth in the United States.216  The 
delicate balance of employer and employee participation will necessarily 
lead to disputes in numbers proportional to ERISA’s impact on the 
national economy.217 
Despite ERISA’s important national role, the Supreme Court denied 
certiorari for Tatum.218  The circuit split has endured for more than 
twenty years; however, the most recent cases illustrate that the debate is 
not yet over.  Ultimately, it is a question of when, not if, the Supreme 
Court will take a burden-shifting case and resolve the split.  Because 
ERISA should be applied uniformly across all states and jurisdictions, a 
split that creates such a disparity in litigation costs and plan 
administration concerns for fiduciaries should make the cut for review in 
coming terms. 
In November of 2017, the plan in the Pioneer Centres case filed a 
petition for certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court.  The Pioneer Centres 
petition gave the Court another opportunity to address the question 
presented in Tatum: 
whether a plaintiff bears the full burden of establishing loss causation 
under [ERISA § 409(a)], as the Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh 
Circuits have held, or whether, as the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth 
Circuits have held,  the burden shifts to the fiduciary to establish the 
absence of loss causation once the beneficiary makes a prima facie case 
by establishing breach of fiduciary duty and associated loss.219 
Pioneer Centres asked the Supreme Court to uphold the burden-shifting 
standard from the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits and ignore 
the plain language of the statute and ERISA’s balanced competing 
purposes.  The Court asked the Solicitor General’s office to make an 
official comment, but the parties voluntarily withdrew their petition 
before any comment was made.220 
Another opportunity for the Supreme Court to resolve the circuit 
split may present itself in 2019.  Plan participants sued Putnam 
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Investments, LLC on behalf of the Putnam Retirement Plan, alleging that 
Putnam Investments included its own investment products in the 401(k) 
offered to its employees without considering whether they were prudent 
investments.221  The District Court held that the plaintiffs had not met 
their burden of proving causation.222  But the First Circuit vacated the 
judgment and approved a burden-shifting framework for ERISA 
claims.223  Putnam Investments requested a delay in enforcement of a 
First Circuit decision to implement a burden-shifting framework so that it 
could file a petition for review with the Supreme Court.224  As of January 
2019, the parties have not filed a petition.  Nevertheless, this will be an 
important case to watch for over the next few months. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 does not 
provide for burden-shifting in the event of a loss resulting from breach of 
fiduciary duty.  Courts should reject the burden-shifting framework 
proposed by some circuits in favor of a strictly textualist construction.  
The plain language of ERISA does not create a burden-shifting 
framework. 
Even if a court rejects a purely text-based interpretation, Congress’s 
clear departure from common law trust liability indicates Congress did 
not intend to merely codify common law requirements for trustees.  
ERISA fiduciary requirements allow for actions and relationships that 
common trust law does not. 
Ultimately, the standard for ERISA fiduciaries needs clarification.  
With almost every circuit court taking a slightly different position, 
protections for plan participants are not equal.  Conversely, employers in 
different states bear different burdens of risk.  Clarification in the future 
is necessary to ensure equitable enforcement of ERISA. 
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